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Abstract: Cognitive and information processing models of depression suggest that 
attention biases for dysphoric information are a causal factor in the development of 
depression. Attention bias modification is a procedure designed to reduce maladaptive 
attention biases in order to reduce emotional distress. Attention bias modification 
literature in the context of depression has demonstrated mixed findings, in that it is 
currently unclear which method of attention-training, if any, is the most effective in 
altering attention biases. Accordingly, in the current study, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four attention-training methods or to a no-training control condition to 
evaluate each method’s ability to reduce maladaptive attention biases and enhance 
adaptive attention biases. The four active training conditions were (1) spatially 
disengaging from dysphoric stimuli, (2) spatially engaging with positive stimuli, (3) a 
combination of spatial disengagement from dysphoric stimuli and engagement with 
positive stimuli, and (4) disengagement from the emotional content of dysphoric images. 
Attention to positive and dysphoric stimuli was measured pre- and post-training via eye 
tracking. We tested the following hypotheses: 1) each active training method would result 
in a significant decrease in attention to dysphoric information compared to control; 2a) 
the positive engagement and combined conditions would result in a significant increase in 
attention to positive information compared to control; and 2b) the spatial disengagement 
and content disengagement conditions would not result in a significant increase in 
attention to positive information relative to control. Change in attention to dysphoric and 
positive information did not differ between the control condition and any of the active 
training conditions, which supported hypothesis 2b but not hypotheses 1 or 2a. The lack 
of differences between the active training and control conditions indicates that the 
methods of attention-training used in the current study are not effective at altering 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
 Attention Bias in Depression ...................................................................................2 
 Attention Bias Modification in Depression .............................................................3 
 Limitations of Prior Depression ABM Studies ........................................................7 
 
II. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................11 
 
 Participants .............................................................................................................11 
 Materials ................................................................................................................11 
            Questionnaires..................................................................................................11 
          Demographic Information .............................................................................11 
          Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) .........................................................12 
          Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7) ...........................................12 
 Attention Bias Measurement..................................................................................12 
       Eye-tracking task .............................................................................................10 
            Eye-tracking technology ..................................................................................15 
            Eye-tracking Outcomes ....................................................................................15 
 Attention Bias Modification ..................................................................................15 
            Spatial Disengagement .....................................................................................17 
            Positive Engagement ........................................................................................18 
            Combined .........................................................................................................19 
            Content Disengagement ...................................................................................19 
            Control .............................................................................................................20 
 Procedure ...............................................................................................................21 
      Analytic Plan ..........................................................................................................21 
 
III. RESULTS ..............................................................................................................23 
 
 Hypotheses Results ................................................................................................23 
 Exploratory Analyses .............................................................................................25 
        Relationships between Different Indices of Attention ....................................25 
        Changes in Attention for Threat and Neutral Information..............................25 
        Effects of Condition on Alternate Attention Indices ......................................26 
             Relationships between attention and Depression and Anxiety Symptoms .....27 
             Changes in from Pre- to Post-Training Compared to No Change ..................29 




IV. DISCUSSION  .......................................................................................................32 
       
 Summary of Findings .............................................................................................32 
      Possible Reasons for Null Findings .......................................................................33 
 Exploratory Findings .............................................................................................41 
 Limitations .............................................................................................................43 
 Strengths ................................................................................................................44 







 APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ..............................................59 
 APPENDIX B: TABLES .......................................................................................79 
 APPENDIX C: FIGURES .....................................................................................85 
 APPENDIX D: MEASURES ................................................................................91 
      Demographic Information .................................................................................92 
      PHQ-9 ...............................................................................................................96 
      GAD-7...............................................................................................................97 


























Table               Page 
    
Table 1 ………………………………………………………………………………….80 
Table 2 ………………………………………………………………………………….81 
Table 3 ………………………………………………………………………………….82 
Table 4 ………………………………………………………………………………….83 




















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure               Page 
 
Figure 1 …………………………………………………………………………………86 
Figure 2 …………………………………………………………………………………87 
Figure 3 …………………………………………………………………………………88 
Figure 4 …………………………………………………………………………………89 
























Cognitive models of depression posit that attention biases for dysphoric emotional 
information contribute to the etiology and maintenance of depressive symptoms (Beck, 
1976; Ingram, 1984). Empirical studies have supported cognitive theories of depression 
by consistently demonstrating that attention biases for dysphoric information are related 
to the development and course of depressive symptoms (Beevers & Carver, 2003; Wells 
& Beevers, 2010; Disner, Shumake, & Beevers, 2017). As attention for dysphoric 
information is associated with the experience of depressive symptoms and mood states, 
increasing numbers of studies have evaluated different methods of experimentally 
altering attention biases. 
 Attention bias modification (ABM) was first developed as a dot-probe paradigm 
that was designed to systematically train individuals to attend to specific valences of 
emotional information (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). 
ABM has been studied in the context of altering attention biases for threatening and 
dysphoric information, and while there is evidence suggesting that attention training 
paradigms are successful in altering attention biases (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; 
Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012), there is inconsistent information 
regarding the efficacy of specific methods of attention-training in altering attention biases 
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for different valences of emotional information.  The current study aimed to directly 
evaluate and compare the efficacy of four different attention-training paradigms in 
altering attention biases for positive, dysphoric, threatening, and neutral information.  
Attention Bias in Depression 
 Beck’s cognitive model of depression (1976) proposes that engaging in negative 
cognitive patterns (e.g., attending to dysphoric information, having negative thoughts 
about the self) enhances vulnerability for depression. Information processing models of 
depression (e.g., Ingram, 1984) posit that individuals who experience depressed mood 
states are more likely to experience negatively biased cognitive processes (e.g., 
attention), resulting in continued experience of depressive symptoms. Taken together, 
these models indicate that attending to and elaborating on dysphoric information serves to 
facilitate the maintenance of depression.  
 Throughout the past few decades, attention biases for emotional information have 
been studied thoroughly in the context of depression. While preliminary studies 
suggested that depressed individuals lacked an attention bias for positive information that 
non-depressed individuals possess (Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1998), these findings 
were likely due to a relatively brief stimulus presentation duration (e.g., 250 ms). 
Subsequent studies that presented stimuli for longer durations (e.g., 1000 ms) have 
demonstrated that depressed individuals preferentially attend toward dysphoric, mood-
congruent information (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & 




Moreover, there is a positive relationship between depressive symptom severity 
and attention bias for dysphoric information; individuals experiencing more severe 
depressive symptoms demonstrate more pronounced attention biases for dysphoric 
information compared to those experiencing mild depressive symptoms (Baert, De Raedt, 
& Koster, 2009). Attention biases for dysphoric information also predict a natural 
worsening of depressive symptoms (Disner, Shumake, & Beevers, 2017). Attention for 
dysphoric information increases one’s vulnerability for developing depression, as 
attention biases for dysphoric information moderate (strengthen) the relationship between 
life stress and depressive symptoms (Beevers & Carver, 2003). Not only are attention 
biases for dysphoric information associated with the course of depression symptom 
severity, but they are also associated with diminished mood recovery following a sad 
mood induction, which suggests that attention biases for dysphoric information facilitate 
the maintenance of sad mood states (Clasen, Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2013). Collectively, 
these findings implicate attention biases for dysphoric information as a factor that 
enhances to depression vulnerability.  
 While the aforementioned studies established that attention biases for dysphoric 
information serve to enhance depression vulnerability, they cannot directly determine 
whether attention biases play a causal role in the experience of depression. Accordingly, 
it is important to evaluate work that has investigated the causal nature of the relationship 
between depression and attention for dysphoric information.    
Attention Bias Modification in Depression 
 Most ABM research has been influenced by a study conducted by MacLeod, 
Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworth, and Holker (2002). In this study, the authors utilized a 
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modified dot-probe task in order to systematically train participants to attend to either 
negative or neutral information. Participants who were trained to attend to negative 
information demonstrated a more negative emotional response to a stress anagram task 
compared to those in the neutral training condition. The findings from this study 
established a causal connection between attention for emotional information and 
emotional experience. Based on their findings, the authors suggested that a neutral or 
positive attention-training condition could be used therapeutically to improve symptoms 
of emotional disorders, and laid the foundation for subsequent ABM studies to expand 
upon their findings.  
 Multiple meta-analyses have been conducted with the purpose of evaluating the 
efficacy of ABM in regard to changing depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, and 
attention to emotional information. A meta-analysis conducted by Beard, Sawyer, and 
Hoffman (2012) found that ABM was generally effective in improving anxiety and 
depressive symptom, but the effect sizes evaluating different methods of attention-
training varied significantly. A meta-analysis by Mogoaşe, David, and Koster (2014) 
found that ABM reduced anxiety and depressive symptoms, but the average effect size 
for altering attention biases within depressed samples was non-significant. A third meta-
analysis by Cristea, Kok, and Cuijpers (2015) revealed small effect sizes for changes in 
symptomology and attention. Moreover, there was a high degree of heterogeneity in 
effect sizes, which suggests that ABM procedures demonstrate variable degrees of 
efficacy regardless of the method of attention-training used or the primary outcome or 
sample. Collectively, these meta-analyses raise concerns regarding the efficacy of ABM 
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in regard to attention change, which highlights the need for further studies to evaluate the 
mechanistic processes of ABM.  
As ABM was developed as a clinical tool for reducing anxiety and depression, the 
primary outcome of most ABM research has been symptom change. However, evidence 
suggests that ABM programs that have failed to successfully modify attention 
subsequently failed to alter emotional distress (e.g., Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 
2010; see Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014, for a review). Since change in attention 
is related to symptom change, it is important to evaluate which methods of ABM are 
reliable in altering attention for emotional information. Accordingly, examining the 
literature surrounding specific mechanisms of attention-training provides more detailed 
information about their efficacy. 
One method of attention-training involves participants to spatially disengage from 
a dysphoric stimulus and engage with a neutral stimulus. Studies evaluating this ABM 
paradigm generally suggest that training individuals to attend away dysphoric 
information and toward neutral information is effective in reducing attention for 
dysphoric information (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; Beevers, Clasen, Enock, & 
Schnyer, 2015; Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015). Moreover, there is evidence 
indicating that training individuals to attend away from negative information and toward 
both positive and neutral information is another effective method for reducing attention 
for dysphoric information (LeMoult, Joormann, Kircanski, & Gotlib, 2016; Yang, Zhang, 
Ding, & Xiao, 2016). While the results of one study conducted by Browning, Holmes, 
Charles, Cowen, & Harmer (2012) suggested that training individuals to attend toward 
positive information is also an effective method for reducing dysphoric attention biases, 
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other studies have yielded conflicting findings regarding the efficacy of training attention 
toward positive information in reducing attention biases for dysphoric information (Baert, 
De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Arditte & Joormann, 2014; Notebaert, Clarke, 
Grafton, & MacLeod, 2015). Another method of attention-training involves having 
participants disengage from the emotional content of pictorial stimuli, and instead focus 
attention on non-emotional aspects of an image. Although this method of attention-
training has only been evaluated in one study to date (e.g., Notebaert et al., 2015), the 
results of this study suggest that training individuals to disengage from emotional content 
is a more effective method of reducing dysphoric attention biases than standard dot-probe 
ABM tasks.   
 The findings from these studies have contributed to our understanding concerning 
the efficacy of various attention-training paradigms in altering attention biases and 
emotional vulnerability. However, these studies also vary in terms of their study design, 
which further contributes to the ambiguity in findings in the ABM literature. More 
specifically, the aforementioned studies employed different types of attention-training 
paradigms, utilized different numbers of trials, varied in terms of stimuli type, and 
yielded disparate and at times conflicting results. Given the differences in methodology 
between these ABM studies, it is important to identify what features are necessary and 
sufficient for ABM to be efficacious. Clarke, Notebaert, and MacLeod (2014) noted that 
the ABM paradigms that failed to change attention also failed to improve mood, which 
highlights the need to specifically evaluate which method(s) of attention-training are 




Limitations of Prior Depression ABM Studies  
 In reviewing the ABM literature, we have identified some limitations of prior 
work that serve as barriers to understanding which mechanisms of ABM contribute to 
effective attention change. First, one of the most commonly used attention-training 
paradigms is a modified dot-probe task (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; Beevers et al., 
2015), but this task combines attentional engagement to non-dysphoric stimuli with 
attentional disengagement from dysphoric stimuli. The dot-probe task presents 2 images 
simultaneously, and after the offset of one image, a probe appears in the location of one 
of the images. In this task, participants can view both stimuli when they are presented 
simultaneously. This creates a potential mixture of attentional mechanisms, which makes 
it unclear which attentional mechanism (e.g., disengagement or engagement) is necessary 
or sufficient to change attention. 
 Second, most ABM tasks that are designed to reduce attention for dysphoric 
information do not actually involve disengagement from the dysphoric stimuli because 
the dysphoric stimulus is not presented on the screen at the same time as the probe image 
at the time of response (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; Baert et al., 2010; Beevers et al., 
2015). The dysphoric stimulus not being presented with the probe stimulus is problematic 
because it hinders our ability to evaluate whether training attention away from dysphoric 
information actually reduces attention for dysphoric information. 
  Third, while the majority of ABM studies have utilized spatial disengagement 
and engagement, it may be possible to train attention by having participants to attend to 
non-emotional components of emotional stimuli while maintaining their visual attention 
on the same stimuli. However, only one study has evaluated this method of attention-
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training to our knowledge (Notebaert et al., 2015). Accordingly, further studies need to 
evaluate this promising method of attention-training to understand if it is a reliable 
method of altering attention.  
 Fourth, ABM studies typically do not compare different methods of attention-
training in the same study (e.g., Baert et al., 2010; Browning et al., 2012). Attention-
training studies typically compare one active training condition to a control condition, 
which affords the ability to compare training and no training in regard to attention and 
symptom change. Without comparing multiple attention-training paradigms, we are 
limited in our ability to draw comparisons between different mechanisms of attention-
training regarding which method is more effective for altering attention biases.  
Current Study 
 In order to address these limitations in the attention-training literature, the current 
study directly compared four different attention-training paradigms to a control condition 
in order to evaluate their ability to alter attention biases for dysphoric, positive, neutral, 
and threatening information. All of the attention-training conditions are depicted below in 
Figure 2. To address the limitations of the dot-probe in differentiating between 
engagement and disengagement of attention, three conditions were employed to 
dismantle these processes. The spatial disengagement condition involved training 
participants to attend away from dysphoric images and toward a masked, non-emotional 
image (i.e., a gray square). For the spatial disengagement condition, the dysphoric 
stimulus remained on the screen with the probe image in order to enhance the likelihood 
that participants disengaged from the dysphoric stimuli. The positive engagement 
condition involved training participants to attend toward positive stimuli, but did not 
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involve disengagement from an emotional stimulus. This isolated the process of engaging 
with positive information. The combined spatial disengagement and positive engagement 
condition involves training participants to attend away from dysphoric information and 
toward positive information.  
 In order to address the limitation that the majority of ABM tasks are designed to 
decreased attention to dysphoric information may not actually involve disengagement 
from dysphoric stimuli, the spatial disengagement condition presented the dysphoric 
stimuli and probe image simultaneously. This provided us more valid information as to 
the efficacy of spatially disengaging from dysphoric stimuli in altering attention biases. 
Additionally, the combined condition involved both disengagement and engagement, 
which allowed us to compared the efficacy of disengagement, engagement, and a 
combination of the two.  
The content disengagement condition involved having participants disengage 
from the emotional content of pictures of sad faces by having participants attend to non-
emotional content of images (i.e., the actor’s apparent biological sex). This condition 
theoretically allowed participants to disengage from the dysphoric emotional content of 
the image, and in doing so we were able to gain more information regarding the efficacy 
of this method of attention-training. Finally, we directly compared four active training 
conditions to a control condition in order to address the limitation that no ABM studies 
directly compare multiple active training conditions. Comparing four active training 
conditions to a control condition allowed us to evaluate which mechanism of attention-
training is the most effective at altering attention.  
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 For this study, participants were randomly assigned to one of five attention-
training conditions. All participants completed four training sessions, and completed an 
eye-tracking task at pre-training and post-training in order to evaluate change in attention. 
As noted above, identifying which attention-training methods effectively train attention is 
important to better understand which methods are most likely to change symptoms 
(Clarke et al., 2014). As such, the primary outcome of this study was change in attention 
bias for dysphoric and positive stimuli because depression is associated with attention to 
dysphoric stimuli and away from positive stimuli (Baert et al., 2009; Duque and Vazquez, 
2015). The following hypotheses were tested:  
1. Each of the active training conditions will result in significant reductions in 
attention to dysphoric information relative to the control condition.  
2. a) Participants in the positive engagement and combined conditions will 
demonstrate significant increases in attention to positive information relative 
to the control, and b) the spatial disengagement and content disengagement 
conditions will not demonstrate significant increases in attention to positive 


















 An a priori power analysis indicated that in order to detect a Cohen’s d effect size 
of 0.8 (Beard et al., 2012) we would need to recruit a sample size of 34 participants per 
condition, with a grand total of 170 participants across all 5 conditions. We planned on 
recruiting 200 total participants to account for loss of data due to poor quality eye-
tracking data, general procedural errors, and scheduling difficulties. After accounting for 
participants with poor quality eye-tracking data, we recruited a final sample of 209 
participants. We specifically recruited males and females who were at least 18 years old; 
there were no additional requirements for participating in the study. After participants 
were recruited they were randomly assigned to one of five attention-training condition.  
Materials (see Appendix B) 
 Questionnaires  
 Demographic Information. Participants provided basic demographic information, 
such as age, gender, income, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, prior medical and mental 
health history, and education history.  
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 Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9). Depression symptoms were measured 
using the PHQ-9, which is a 9-item self-report measure that assesses the frequency of 
depressive symptoms over the past two weeks (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). 
Scores on the PHQ-9 range from 0 to 27, with greater scores indicating greater severity of 
depressive symptoms. The PHQ-9 has demonstrated excellent test-retest reliability (r = 
.84). In the current study, the PHQ-9 demonstrated reliable internal consistency (α = .88). 
While we did not specifically recruit participants with elevated depressive symptoms, we 
included the PHQ-9 to evaluate whether any change in attention may be attributed to 
depressive symptoms.  
 Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7). Anxiety symptoms were 
measured using the GAD-7, which is a 7-item self-report measure that assesses for 
severity of anxiety symptoms (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Lowe, 2006). The GAD-7 
asks respondents how often, over the past two weeks, they are bothered by specific 
symptoms of anxiety. Responses are recorded on a 4-point Likert scale, with lower scores 
indicating lower frequency of experiencing anxiety symptoms. The GAD-7 has 
demonstrated excellent test-retest reliability (r = .83), and in the current study the GAD-7 
exhibited strong internal validity (α = .91). Anxiety symptoms were also measured for 
exploratory purposes, specifically to evaluate whether any variation in attention may be 
related to the experience of anxiety.  
Attention Bias Measurement 
Eye-tracking task. Participants completed an eye-tracking task at baseline 
(session 1) and post-test (session 4). The task involved twelve trials of a free-viewing 
eye-tracking procedure. Each trial contained 4 images, and each image displayed 
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individuals or scenarios that conveyed one of four valences of emotional information: 
happiness, sadness, threat, or neutral (see Figure 1 for an example eye-tracking trial).  
In total, 48 images were chosen, 15 images from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and 33 images from 
the EmoPics database (Wessa, Kanske, Neumeister, Bode, Heissler, & Schӧnfelder, 
2010)1. Both the IAPS and EmoPics databases were used in order to obtain more well-
defined and homogenous image categories. The IAPS and the EmoPics databases are 
highly comparable as their image rating procedures were near identical; for both 
databases, participants were asked to rate the valence of each image using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM) scales, with lower valence scores representing more 
unpleasant images (Lang et al, 2008; Wessa et al., 2010). Due to the methodological 
similarities between the databases, it is sensible to create mean valence ratings for each 
emotional category even though images were drawn from disparate sources. For this 
study specifically, we selected images with valence ratings of 6.6 or higher for the 
positive images, 4.4 or lower for dysphoric and threatening images, and between 4.5 and 
6.5 for the neutral images. Prior to conducting the study, Lucas Kelberer and Dr. Tony 
Wells independently identified each negative image as either “dysphoric” or 
“threatening”. Any images with conflicting labels were to be removed; however, 
agreement for the images in this study was perfect between raters. Table 1 provides the 
means and standard deviations for valence, arousal, RGB, and luminance scores for all of 
the images used, as well as summary statistics for the one-way ANOVA described below.  
                                                          
1 The following EmoPics images were used: 013 023 025 027 031 032 037 040 042 043 049 074 093 099 
106 115 119 133 145 147 148 149 157 159 208 211 217 219 220 221 222 224 225. The following IAPS 
images were used: 2457 2683 2691 2811 2900 6231 6312 6510 6520 6530 6540 6561 6562 6571 9332. 
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As expected, the one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences in valence 
ratings between the images chosen for the eye-tracking paradigm. Dysphoric and threat 
images did not differ significantly in valence, but the other comparisons were all 
significantly different. There were also expected significant differences in arousal 
between the different categories of images with all image types differing significantly 
from each other. The ANOVA also revealed significant differences across the categories 
of emotional stimuli for both luminance and RGB distribution. Luminance and RGB 
ratings were only significantly different between positive and threatening images.   
 During the eye-tracking task, the four valences of emotional information were 
counter-balanced for each trial, meaning that the location of the different valences of 
emotional information changed in every trial. The experimenter clicked the mouse to 
proceed to the image slide, but only once participants visually fixated on the cross in the 
center of the screen. This was done in order to standardize the participants’ gaze location 
at the start of each trial and to prevent the starting gaze location from beginning on the 
location of any of the images presented in the task. During the task, participants were 
instructed to freely gaze at the images as if they were looking at a photo album, which is 
a protocol consistent with past studies that have utilized eye-tracking (e.g., Kellough et 
al., 2008). Each trial lasted 30 seconds, and the experimenters instructed participants to 
focus on the images on the slide if their gaze strayed from the slide. Throughout the eye-
tracking paradigm, participants sat 60-70 cm away from the viewing monitor in order to 
improve the accuracy of the eye-tracking data. Each image measured approximately 11.4 
cm (10° visual angle) by 9.8 cm (8.6° visual angle) on the screen.    
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 Eye-tracking technology. Line of visual gaze was assessed using a Tobii T60 
eye-tracker in conjunction with the accompanying Tobii Studio Software. The viewing 
screen measures 17 inches diagonally and has a display resolution of 1280x1024 pixels. 
The T60 has binocular infrared sensors that detect the position of the pupils and corneal 
reflection in both eyes as a metric of attention. Gaze location was sampled every 16.7 ms 
(or 60 Hz). Each image that displayed one of the valences of emotional information was 
identified as an area of interest (AOI) in order to directly associate attentional gaze to 
stimuli of a given emotional valence.  
 Eye-tracking outcomes. Using Tobii Studio Software, several indices of attention 
were calculated for each AOI. Total visit duration (TVD) was the primary index used to 
assess for attention bias in this study. Prior research has utilized TVD as a primary index 
of attention because it is related to sustained stages of information processing (Armstrong 
& Olatungi, 2012; Peckham et al., 2010). A visit is defined as the amount of time an 
individual spends attending to a given AOI throughout the duration of stimuli 
presentation. Visits for each AOI were summed across all trials, creating a TVD variable 
for each valence of emotional information. Separate TVD variables were created for 
baseline and post-training measurements of attention. While TVD is the most common 
metric used to assess for sustained attention bias in eye-tracking research, additional 
indices of attention were also calculated and utilized as part of exploratory analyses for 
this project.  
Attention Bias Modification  
 For this study, participants completed four separate sessions of ABM training. 
Consistent with prior ABM research (e.g., Wells & Beevers, 2010), all four training 
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sessions were scheduled within a 2-week period. The ABM paradigms used for this study 
were created in E-Prime, which is a program that is frequently used for designing 
behavioral experiments. Each individual training session involved 144 training trials; 
participants completed 576 trials in total after completing all four training sessions, which 
is consistent with past ABM research (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002). Participants were 
randomized to one of the five attention-training conditions by the computer program in 
order to keep the researchers blind to condition. Prior to beginning the task, the 
participants were provided with instructions for their task. They were also given four test 
trials and were provided feedback concerning whether they completed the test trials 
correctly. Feedback was not provided during the rest of the trials. Halfway through the 
ABM task, participants were given the opportunity to take a small break.  
 The images utilized for the ABM tasks were selected from the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces database2 (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Across 
the ABM programs, 56 total images were utilized, with 24 images selected from both the 
sad and happy categories, and the remaining 8 images selected from the neutral category. 
The faces were selected for their reliability in being identified as the correct emotional 
expression. For the images utilized in the current study, participants correctly identified 
dysphoric images at an average rate of 91.43%, positive images at an average rate of 
97.29%, and neutral images at an average rate of 98.57% (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008). 
                                                          
2 The following KDEF images were used: AF07SAS, AF11SAS, AF13SAS, AF19SAS, AF20SAS, AM04SAS, 
AM05SAS, AM06SAS, AM11SAS, AM14SAS, AM17SAS, AM18SAS, AM30SAS, BF06SAS, BF11SAS, 
BF13SAS, BF17SAS, BF22SAS, BF24SAS, BF28SAS, BM01SAS, BM23SAS, BM25SAS, BM34SAS, AF07HAS, 
AF11HAS, AF13HAS, AF19HAS, AF20HAS, AM04HAS, AM05HAS, AM06HAS, AM11HAS, AM14HAS, 
AM17HAS, AM18HAS, AM30HAS, BF06HAS, BF11HAS, BF13HAS, BF17HAS, BF22HAS, BF24HAS, 
BF28HAS, BM01HAS, BM23HAS, BM25HAS, BM34HAS, AF07NES, AF11NES, AF13NES, AF19NES, 
AM04NES, AM05NES, AM11NES, AM14NES 
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The images chosen for the ABM tasks were equally distributed between male and female 
actors. See Figure 2 for examples of each training condition.    
 Spatial Disengagement. Participants who were randomly assigned to this 
condition (N = 46) were instructed that they needed to identify a probe image when it 
appeared on the screen. The instructions stated that they should keep their right and left 
index fingers over the ‘M’ and ‘N’ keys, respectively, and to press the ‘M’ key if the 
image is a dollar sign ($) or to press the ‘N’ key if the probe image is a percent sign (%). 
After the offset of the central fixation cross, a dysphoric face was presented in the center 
of the screen. After 1000 ms, an image with no emotional valence (i.e., a gray square) 
appeared either to the left or the right of the centrally-presented face. After 1000 ms, the 
gray square disappeared and the visual probe (dollar or percent sign) appeared in the 
same visual field where the gray image previously appeared. For the spatial 
disengagement condition, participants were asked to identify the probe image as quickly 
as possible. The dysphoric face remained present on the screen until the participant 
responded to the probe, or until 1000 ms passed. This constraint was placed on 
participants’ response times as longer response latencies could have potentially reduced 
the likelihood that a contingency was established between the emotional content of the 
dysphoric stimuli and the location of the probe image. Moreover, limiting participants’ 
response times has been utilized in other ABM tasks (e.g., Sharpe, Johnson, & Dear, 
2015; Mayer, Wilcox, Dodd, Klimaj, Dekonenko, Claus, & Pogenschutz, 2016). The 24 
dysphoric stimuli used for this task were presented in a random order for each participant. 
Moreover, each cycle of 24 images in each training session of 144 trials was presented in 
a different random order.   
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 Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition were trained to 
disengage from dysphoric stimuli. They visually engaged with the dysphoric stimulus 
because the stimulus appeared in the location of the fixation cross. Then, participants 
disengaged with the dysphoric stimulus, attending towards the gray square, which 
signaled the location of the probe with 100% accuracy.  
 Positive Engagement. Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition 
(N = 39) were provided with instructions that were identical to the instructions for the 
spatial disengagement condition; participants were instructed that they were supposed to 
identify the probe image ($ or %) that appeared throughout the task. For this condition, a 
centrally presented image with no emotional valence (a gray square) was shown in the 
center of the screen for 1000 ms. After that time, an image displaying a happy face 
appeared to either side of the gray square. After another 1000 ms, the happy face 
disappeared and the probe image appeared in the same visual field where the image of the 
happy face was previously located. Participants were required to identify the probe as 
quickly and accurately as possible. The 24 happy stimuli were presented in a different 
random order for each participant, and each cycle of 24 images in each training session of 
144 trials was presented in a new random order. The probe stimulus remained on the 
screen until the participant responded, or until 1000 ms passed. 
 Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition were trained to 
specifically attend toward positive stimuli. First, they engaged with the non-emotional 
image because it appeared in the location of the fixation cross. Then, participants 




 Combined. Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition (N = 41) 
were provided instructions that mirrored instructions from the spatial disengagement and 
positive engagement condition. Initially, a centrally presented dysphoric face appeared 
for 1000 ms. Then, a happy face was presented on either side of the central dysphoric 
face and remained on screen with the dysphoric face for 1000 ms. After this time, the 
happy image disappeared and a probe image immediately appeared in the same visual 
field where the happy face was presented previously. Consistent with other conditions, 
participants were asked to identify the probe image as quickly and accurately as possible. 
The dysphoric face remained on the screen with the probe image until the participant 
responded or until 1000 ms passed. The 24 dysphoric images and 24 positive images 
were presented in a different random order for each participants, and each cycle of 24 
images in each training session of 144 trials was presented in a new random order.  
 Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition were trained to 
specifically shift their attention away from dysphoric stimuli and toward positive stimuli. 
First, they visually engaged with the centrally-presented dysphoric stimuli because it 
appeared in the location of the fixation cross. Then, participants disengaged from the 
dysphoric image and attended toward the positive image, which signaled the location of 
the probe image with 100% accuracy. 
 Content Disengagement. Participants who were randomly assigned to this 
condition (N = 45) were instructed to identify the apparent biological sex of the actor 
displayed in the images throughout the task. More specifically, participants were told to 
keep their right and left index fingers over the ‘M’ and ‘N’ keys, respectively, and to 
press the ‘M’ key if they thought the actor was male or the ‘N’ key if they thought the 
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actor was female. After they completed the instructions and test trials, participants began 
the training phase. Following the offset of the fixation cross, a dysphoric face was 
presented in the center of the screen. The 24 dysphoric stimuli were presented in a 
different random order for each participant, and each cycle of 24 images in each training 
session of 144 trials was presented in a new random order. For this condition, the 
centrally presented dysphoric images were displayed until the participant provided a 
response, or until 1000 ms passed.  
 Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition were trained to 
disengage from the dysphoric emotional content of the image. While participants still be 
visually engaged with the dysphoric image, the focus of their attention was on the 
physical details of the actors and not on the emotional content of the image.  
 Control. Participants randomized to this condition (N = 38) were provided with 
instructions that mirrored the instructions and structure from the positive engagement 
condition. Following the offset of the fixation cross, a centrally-presented gray square 
was shown on the screen for 1000 ms. After this time, an image displaying either a 
dysphoric, positive, or neutral face appeared to either side of the gray square. Like with 
other conditions, participants randomized to the control condition were asked to identify 
the probe as quickly and as accurately as possible. For this condition, dysphoric, positive, 
and neutral faces were displayed with equal frequency across all the trials. The image of 
the face remained on the screen until the participant provided a response, or until 1000 
ms passed. The 8 dysphoric stimuli, 8 positive stimuli, and 8 neutral stimuli utilized 
throughout this task were all presented in a different random order for each participant. 
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Moreover, each cycle of 24 images in each training session of 144 trials was presented in 
a new random order.  
 Participants who were randomly assigned to this condition were trained to attend 
equally toward dysphoric, positive, and neutral images. Initially, they engaged with the 
image of the gray square because it appeared in the location of the fixation cross. Then, 
participants shifted their attention toward an image of either a dysphoric, positive, or 
neutral face, which signaled the location of the probe with 100% accuracy.  
Procedure 
 All data collection and study procedures were conducted in North Murray 023 in 
the Behavior, Affect, and Thinking Laboratory. Participants completed four study 
sessions within a two-week period. After arriving to the lab for the first session, 
participants provided informed consent to participate in the study. Afterward, participants 
completed self-report measures for depressive and anxiety symptoms. Then, participants 
completed the eye-tracking task in order to evaluate attentional biases. After participants 
completed their baseline attention measurements, they completed their first attention-
training task. For the second and third sessions, participants completed additional 
attention-training tasks. For the fourth session, participants completed the final training 
task, followed by the same questionnaires and eye-tracking task administered in the 
initial training session. After completing the study procedures for the fourth session, 
participants were debriefed regarding the purposes of the study. 
Analytic Plan 
 Prior to running the analyses, a change score in total visit duration (TVD) for 
dysphoric stimuli was created by subtracting the pre-training TVD for dysphoric stimuli 
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from the post-training TVD for dysphoric stimuli. We also created a change score in 
TVD for positive information by subtracting the pre-training TVD for positive stimuli 
from the post-training TVD for positive stimuli. We created two additional change 
variables for changes in TVD for neutral and threatening information. In order to control 
for multiple comparisons in the analyses for our hypotheses and for the exploratory 




























 Two-hundred and twenty-one participants from Oklahoma State University 
completed all four sessions for the study. Twelve participants were removed from the 
sample due to poor quality in eye-tracking data (i.e., <70% valid eye-tracking data on the 
eye-tracking task), resulting in a final sample of 209 participants whose data were used in 
the analyses. Participants had a mean age of 19.00 (SD = 1.05), and 75.1% of participants 
identified as female. Participants were primarily Caucasian (74.2%), and 11% were Black 
or African American, 5.3% were Native American or Alaskan Native, 3.3% were Asian 
or Asian American, and 1.9% did not answer. Eight point one percent of participants 
identified as being Hispanic or Latino/a.  
Hypotheses Results 
To test hypothesis 1 – that each of the active training conditions would result in 
significant reductions in attention to dysphoric information relative to the control 
condition – four planned independent samples t-tests were conducted. The results are 
depicted in Figure 3.  
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The results of these analyses suggested that none of the active training conditions 
resulted in a significant decrease in attention for dysphoric information compared to the 
control condition; change in attention for dysphoric information was not statistically 
significantly different between the control condition and the spatial disengagement, t(82) 
= .56, p = .58, d = .12, positive engagement, t(75) = .48, p = .63, d = .11, combined, t(77) 
= .47, p = .64, d = .11, or content disengagement conditions, t(81) = -1.61, p = .11, d = 
.36. As hypothesis 1 was not supported, these findings suggest that none of the active 
training conditions were more effective than the control condition in reducing attention 
for dysphoric information.  
 To test hypothesis 2a – that participants in the positive engagement and combined 
conditions would demonstrate significant increases in attention to positive information 
relative to control – and hypothesis 2b – that participants in the spatial disengagement 
and content disengagement conditions would not demonstrate significant increases in 
attention to positive information relative to control – four planned independent samples t-
tests were conducted. The results of these analyses are also depicted in Figure 3. The 
results of these analyses suggested that none of the active training conditions resulted in a 
significant increase in attention for positive information compared to the control 
condition; change in attention for positive information was not statistically significantly 
different between the control condition and the spatial disengagement, t(82) = .67, p = 
.51, d = .15, positive engagement, t(75) = -.41, p = .68, d = .09, combined, t(77) = -.47, p 
= .64, d = .11, or content disengagement conditions, t(81) = 1.78, p = .08, d = .40. As 
hypothesis 2a was not supported and hypothesis 2b was supported, these findings suggest 
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that the active training conditions were not more effective than the control condition in 
increasing attention to positive information. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Relationships between Different Indices of Attention 
 We conducted a correlation analysis to evaluate the relationships between total 
visit duration and other indices of attention, including total fixation duration, fixation 
count, and first fixation duration. We focused on evaluating the relationships between 
these indices of attention within specific categories of emotional information (e.g., TVD 
for dysphoric and fixation count for dysphoric). The results of this analysis are depicted 
in Table 2. The relationships between total visit duration, total fixation duration, and 
fixation count were all significant at p < .001. As expected, first fixation duration, which 
is a metric for difficulty disengaging from stimuli, was not positively correlated with any 
of the indices of sustained attention.  
 Changes in Attention for Threat and Neutral Information 
 We also evaluated whether any of our active training conditions differed from the 
control condition in regard to changes in attention for neutral and threatening 
information. Four independent samples t-tests were conducted in over to evaluate for 
differences between the training conditions and control condition in regard to change in 
TVD for neutral information. Four additional independent samples t-tests were conducted 




between the training conditions and control condition in regard to change in TVD for 
threatening information. The results of these analyses are depicted in Figure 4. The 
results indicate that none of the active training conditions differed significantly from the 
control condition in regard to change in attention for neutral information (all p-values > 
.18) or threatening information (all p-values > .11).  
Effects of Condition on Alternate Attention Indices 
 A 4 (stimulus type) x 2 (time) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA with 
condition as the between-subjects factor was conducted in order to evaluate whether there 
were differences between the conditions in changes in fixation duration. There was a 
significant main effect of time, F = 3.95, p = .048, p
2 = .02, which was driven by greater 
fixation duration at pre-training compared to post-training. There was also a significant 
main effect of stimulus type, F = 30.47, p < .001, p
2 = .31, which was driven by greater 
average fixation duration for positive information compared to the other valences of 
emotional information. The main effect of condition and the time by condition, stimulus 
by condition, stimulus by time, and time by stimulus by condition interactions were all 
non-significant (p > .09 for the main effect and interactions). 
 An additional 4 (stimulus type) x 2 (time) x 2 (condition) repeated measures 
ANOVA with condition as the between-subjects factor was conducted in order to 
evaluate whether there were differences between the conditions in changes in fixation 
count. There was a main effect of time, F = 13.68, p < .001, p
2 = .06, which was driven 
by greater number of fixation counts at pre-training compared to post-training. There was 
also a main effect of stimulus type, F = 29.82, p < .001, p
2 = .31, which was driven by 




categories of emotional information. There was also a significant time by stimulus type 
interaction, F = 3.33, p < .021,p
2 = .05, which was driven by decreases in fixation count 
for dysphoric (t = 3.44, p = .001), neutral (t = 2.26, p = .03), and threatening (t = 4.38, p < 
.001) information from pre-training to post-training. The main effect of condition and the 
time by condition, stimulus by condition, and time by stimulus by condition interactions 
were all non-significant (p > .40 for all interactions).  
 Another 4 (stimulus type) x 2 (time) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA 
with condition as the between-subjects factor was conducted in order to evaluate whether 
there were differences between the conditions in changes in first fixation duration. There 
was a main effect of stimulus type, F = 10.61, p < .001, p
2 = .14, which was driven by a 
greater average first fixation duration for positive information compared to the other 
valences of emotional information. The main effect of time was marginally non-
significant, F = 3.23, p = .074, p
2 = .02. The main effect of condition and the time by 
condition, stimulus type by condition, time by stimulus type, and time by stimulus type 
by condition interactions were all non-significant (p > .17 for the main effect and all 
interactions).  
 Relationship between Attention and Depression and Anxiety Symptoms 
In order to evaluate whether depression symptoms were related to change in 
attention in all of our conditions, we conducted a 4 (stimulus type) x 2 (time) x 2 
(condition) repeated measures ANOVA, with pre-training PHQ-9 scores included as a 
covariate. The time by depression symptom interaction was not significant, F = .77, p = 
.38, p
2 = .004, indicating that depression symptoms did not change from pre-training to 




was also not significant, F = 1.49, p = .22, p
2 = .02, indicating that depression symptoms 
were not related to attention for different categories of emotional information. The time 
by stimulus type by depression symptom interaction was not significant, F = .26, p = .85, 
p
2 = .004, indicating that depression symptom severity was not related to change in 
attention for any category of emotional information across all of the training conditions. 
Finally, the time by stimulus type by condition interaction with depressive symptoms as a 
covariate was also not significant, F = 1.30, p = .22, p
2 = .025, indicating that, when 
controlling for depressive symptoms, there were no significant differences in changes in 
total visit duration across for any category of information across all of the conditions. 
Additional analyses were conducted in order to evaluate whether anxiety 
symptoms were related to change in attention in all of our conditions. We conducted a 4 
(stimulus type) x 2 (time) x 2 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA, with pre-training 
GAD-7 scores included as a covariate. The time by anxiety symptom interaction was not 
significant, F = .895, p = .345, p
2 = .004, indicating that anxiety symptoms did not 
change from pre-training to post-training across all conditions. The stimulus type by 
anxiety symptom interaction was also not significant, F = 1.61, p = .190, p
2 = .024, 
indicating that anxiety symptoms were not related to attention for different categories of 
emotional information. The time by stimulus type by anxiety symptom interaction was 
not significant, F = .450, p = .718, p
2 = .007, indicating that anxiety symptom severity 
was not related to change in attention for any category of emotional information across 
all of the training conditions. Finally, the time by stimulus type by condition interaction 
with anxiety symptoms as a covariate was also not significant, F = 1.32, p = .20, p
2 = 




differences in changes in total visit duration for any category of information across all 
conditions. 
 We also conducted correlational analyses across all conditions in order to evaluate 
for any significant relationships between change in attention for all categories of 
emotional information, change in depressive symptoms, and change in anxiety 
symptoms. Results from this analysis are displayed on Table 3. The analyses revealed 
that across all conditions, there were no significant relationships between changes in 
depression or anxiety symptoms and changes in total visit duration for any category of 
emotional information (all p-values > .12). 
 Changes from Pre- to Post-Training Compared to No Change 
 We conducted exploratory analyses to determine if the training conditions 
resulted in changes from pre- to post-training that differed significantly from zero. 
Despite the fact that the training conditions did not differ from the control condition, this 
would allow us to identify effects that may be fruitful to explore in future studies. A one-
sample t-test was conducted for each of the conditions comparing values to zero. Change 
in attention for dysphoric, positive, threatening, and neutral information, as well as 
change scores for depression and anxiety symptoms were utilized as the outcome 
variables. Changes in attention for dysphoric and positive information are depicted in 
Figure 3 on page 26, changes in attention for neutral and threatening information are 
depicted in Figure 4 on page 29, and changes in depression and anxiety symptoms are 




The spatial disengagement condition did not result in significant changes in 
attention to any valence of emotional information, depression symptoms, or anxiety 
symptoms compared to no change (all p-values > .08). 
The positive engagement condition resulted in a marginally non-significant 
decrease in attention for neutral information, t(38) = -1.948, p = .059, d = -.32, and a 
significant decrease in depressive symptoms, t(38) = -2.30, p = .027, d = -.37, compared 
to no change. This condition did not result in significant changes in attention to 
dysphoric, attention to positive, attention to threatening, or anxiety symptoms compared 
to no change (all p-values > .07). 
The combined condition demonstrated a significant reduction in anxiety 
symptoms t(40) = -2.20, p = .034, d = -.34, compared to no change, but did not result in 
significant changes in attention to any valence of emotional information or depressive 
symptoms compared (all p-values > .20). 
The content disengagement condition resulted in a significant reduction in 
attention for dysphoric information, t(44) = -2.96, p = .005, d = -.44, attention for 
threatening information, t(44) = -2.81, p = .007, d = -.42, and a significant increase in 
attention to positive information, t(44) = 2.55, p = .014, d = .38, compared to no change. 
The content disengagement condition did not result in significant changes in attention to 
neutral information, depressive symptoms, or anxiety symptoms compared to no change 
(all p-values > .14). 
The control condition demonstrated significant reductions in anxiety symptoms, 




changes in attention to any valence of emotional information or depressive symptoms (all 
p-values > .53).    
Gender Differences in Attention  
 An independent samples t-test was conducted in order evaluate whether there 
were any gender differences in pre-training attention, post-training attention, or changes 
in attention. Results of this analysis are depicted in Table 4. The results suggest that 
females spent significantly less time attending to threatening information than males at 
pre-training, t(206) = -2.31, p = .02, d = .40, and post-training, t(206) = -2.42, p = .02, d = 
.39. Additionally, females spent significantly less time attending to neutral information 
than males at pre-training, t(206) = -2.14, p = .033, d = .33. There were no other 




















Summary of Findings 
The current study compared four active attention-training methods to a control 
condition in order to evaluate which mechanisms of attention-training are effective for 
changing attention. Our first hypothesis, that the active training conditions would result in 
significant reductions in attention for dysphoric information relative to the control 
condition, was not supported. None of the methods of attention-training employed in this 
study were more effective in altering attention for dysphoric stimuli compared to 
engaging equally to dysphoric, neutral, and positive information. This finding stands in 
contrast to prior studies that have found a significant effect of ABM on attention to 
dysphoric information (Wells & Beevers, 2010; Beevers et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2015; 
LeMoult et al., 2016 Yang et al., 2016), but it is consistent with past literature that did not 
find dot-probe ABM tasks effective for altering attention biases for dysphoric 
information (Baert et al., 2010; Arditte & Joormann, 2014; Notebaert et al., 2015).  
We did not find support for hypothesis 2a, that the positive engagement and 
combined conditions would result in increased attention to positive information compared 





These results are in contrast to findings supporting training attention to positive 
information as a means of enhancing attention biases for positive information (Browning 
et al., 2012; LeMoult et al., 2016). However, this finding adds to literature suggesting this 
mechanism of attention-training is not effective at enhancing attention for positive 
information compared to no training (Arditte & Joormann, 2014; Notebaert et al., 2015). 
Further, we found support for hypothesis 2b, that the spatial disengagement and content 
disengagement condition would not result in increased attention to positive information 
compared to the control condition. Taken together, these findings imply that no method 
of ABM employed in the current study was effective at increasing attention to positive 
information.  
The current study was adequately powered to detect the hypothesized effects – if 
the size of the effect as reported in Beard and colleagues (2012) is an accurate 
representation of the true effect size – so the lack of differences between active and 
control conditions indicates that the effect of ABM on attention change in the current 
study was non-existent. Recent meta-analyses suggest that ABM has questionable 
efficacy in regard to changing attention for dysphoric information (Mogoaşe et al., 2014; 
Cristea et al., 2015). The findings from the current study further highlight the 
questionable efficacy of ABM outlined in these meta-analyses; since none of our active 
training conditions differed from the control condition, the current study suggests that, 
regardless of the method, ABM is not an effective method of altering attention for 
dysphoric information. There are several potential reasons why the current study did not 




Possible Reasons for Null Findings   
It is common for ABM studies to use a standard (i.e., non-training) dot-probe or 
other standard non-training task as a control condition (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; 
Baert et al., 2010; LeMoult et al., 2016), and the current study followed this convention 
by employing a dot-probe task designed to train attention equally toward dysphoric, 
neutral, and positive information. By training attention equally toward multiple valences 
of emotional information, this type of control condition should theoretically result in no 
change in attention bias. While there is evidence that this type of control condition does 
not result in changes in attention (e.g., Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang et al., 2015), this 
type of control condition may possess some unintended training effects. Prior ABM 
studies have found that other methodologically similar control conditions have yielded 
unexpected changes in attention (Boettcher, Berger, & Renneberg, 2012; Badura-Brack, 
Naim, Ryan, Levy, Abend, Khanna, McDermott, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 2015; Price, 
Kuckertz, Amir, Bar-Haim, Carlbring, & Wallace, 2017).  
It has been suggested that while this type of control condition does not directly 
alter attention biases, it may result in enhanced attentional control (Heeren, Mogoaşe, 
McNally, Schmitz, & Phillippot, 2015; Heeren, De Raedt, Koster, & Phillippot, 2013). 
Attentional control is associated with improved emotion regulation, as enhancing 
attentional control improves one’s ability to disengage and shift attention away from 
emotionally distressing information to improve mood (Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Bardeen, Tull, Dixon-Gordon, Stevens, & Gratz, 2015). Therefore, our control condition 
may have resulted in improved attentional control, thereby reducing our ability to detect 




Alternatively, it has been argued that a no-training condition designed to train 
attention equally to multiple valences of emotional information may unintentionally 
resulted in direct changes in attention for emotional information (Schoorl, Putman, & 
Does, 2012; McNally, 2018). Because this type of control condition involves training 
attention equally toward different categories of emotional information, the trials that 
involve training attention toward emotionally positive information may constitute a lower 
dose of ABM, which can result in adaptive changes in attention bias. Following this 
logic, it possible that requiring participants to attend equally to neutral, dysphoric, and 
positive information in the current study conferred some benefits because the task still 
involved attending toward positive and neutral information. However, participants in our 
control condition did not demonstrate any significant changes in attention compared to no 
change, therefore the null findings were likely not due to an over-active control 
condition. 
Another criticism of ABM studies is that they may not have provided participants 
with enough training trials or a sufficient “dose” of ABM that was adequate to modify 
attention (Kuckertz & Amir, 2015). The attention-training conditions evaluated in the 
current study had a higher number of training trials than other ABM tasks that were 
successfully able to alter attentional biases (e.g., LeMoult et al., 2016; Beshai et al., 
2014). While the amount of training trials we utilized theoretically should have been 
sufficient to alter attention, a meta-analysis evaluating 12 ABM studies found that 
number of sessions moderated the effect of attention-training on change in attention bias 
(Hakamata, Lissek, Bar-Haim, Britton, Fox, Leibenluft, Ernst, & Pine, 2010).  




training sessions have demonstrated more success in modifying attention for negative and 
positive information (e.g., Wells & Beevers, 2010; Beevers et al., 2015; Yang et al., 
2015; Yang et al., 2016). It is possible that the “dosage” of ABM administered in the 
current study was not sufficient to affect attention bias, which would at least partially 
explain our null findings.  
A methodological factor that may have also contributed to the lack of differences 
between the training and control conditions is the orientation of stimuli. Past meta-
analyses have found that the orientation of stimuli in ABM tasks is a factor that 
influences the effectiveness of attention-training. Attention-training tasks utilizing a top-
bottom (vertical) stimuli orientation have achieved greater effects than tasks utilizing a 
left-right (horizontal) orientation (Hakamata et al., 2010; Beard et al., 2012). In the 
current study, the stimuli were presented in a horizontal orientation across all conditions, 
which may have by itself been a limiting factor for our active training conditions. A study 
conducted by Meier and Robinson (2006) found that negative affect in general, and 
depressive symptoms specifically, are associated with selective attention downward. The 
authors suggest that altering this vertical bias in selective attention may reduce the 
intensity of depressive symptoms. As such, utilizing a vertical presentation could have 
resulted in greater training effects on attention. 
In the current study, the instructions of the active training conditions did not 
inform participants to the contingency between probe stimuli and emotional stimuli in 
their respective attention-training tasks. This ‘implicit’ method of training is thought to 
produce more generalized effects of attention-training (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012), and 




target-stimulus contingency in the dot-probe tasks (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; 
Beevers et al., 2015; LeMoult et al., 2016). However, there is evidence to suggest that 
providing participants with explicit instructions (i.e., providing information regarding the 
contingency between probe stimulus and target stimulus) enhances the effect of attention-
training on altering attention biases (Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Grafton, 
Mackintosh, Vujic, & MacLeod, 2013; Nishiguchi, Takano, & Tanno, 2015). Providing 
explicit instructions may require participants to control their attention in a top-down 
fashion in order to attend away from negative stimuli (Nishiguchi et al., 2015). Further, a 
top-down mechanism of attentional control is thought to require more effort, which may 
enhance the effect of attention-training for participants receiving explicit instructions. 
Given these findings regarding explicit instruction presentation, it is possible that 
utilizing implicit training instructions reduced the effectiveness of our attention-training 
paradigms.  
It is also possible that we were not able to detect differences between our active 
training conditions and control condition because our participants did not demonstrate 
depressive attentional biases at baseline. Across all conditions, participants on average 
spent more time attending to positive stimuli than dysphoric stimuli, therefore attempting 
to decrease attention to dysphoric information and/or increase attention to positive 
information may have been difficult without any pre-existing depressive attentional 
patterns. Mastikhina and Dobson (2017) conducted a replication of the study conducted 
by Wells and Beevers (2010), and while ABM was effective at improving depressive 
symptoms, their training conditions did not result in a significant change in attention bias. 




participants not demonstrating any attention biases for dysphoric information, even 
though they endorsed elevated depressive symptoms. Moreover, Krujit and Carlbring 
suggested that ABM programs may not be effective in altering attention because, “pre-
existing [attention] bias is a prerequisite for successful modification of bias through 
contingency-based [A]BM” (2018, p. 16). As our sample did not demonstrate depressive 
attention biases prior to training, it is possible that our training conditions were not able 
to alter attention in the hypothesized directions because participants already had attention 
biases away from dysphoric information and toward positive information.   
Not only can pre-existing attentional biases affect the success of ABM programs, 
but the variance of attentional biases over time also contributes to the efficacy of ABM. 
Heeren, Phillippot, and Koster (2014) evaluated how stable and dynamic components of 
attention bias affect the performance of ABM tasks. The authors evaluated attention 
biases at two time points prior to having participants complete an ABM task. The stable 
attention bias component was defined as variance shared in attention bias between the 
two timepoints, and the dynamic attention bias component was defined as the variance 
specific to a given timepoint. The findings from this study suggest that the stable 
component predicted maintenance of attention bias toward negative information after the 
ABM task, while the dynamic component was predictive of improvement following the 
task. This suggests that attention biases that are more stable prior to attention-training are 
more resistant to change. While our study design does not permit us to evaluate stability 
of attention biases prior to training, more stable attention biases at baseline could have 




Another criticism regarding the inconsistency of ABM tasks in altering depressive 
attention biases is that during the dot-probe task, participants may ignore the valence of 
the emotional stimuli presented and only focus their attention on the probe when it is 
presented (Notebaert et al., 2015; Ferrari, Möbius, van Opdorp, Becker, & Rinck, 2016). 
By not attending to the stimuli in dot-probe ABM tasks, participants would theoretically 
fail to establish a contingency between the probe image and emotional information, 
therefore reducing the efficacy of ABM tasks. It is possible that our null findings may 
also be partially explained by participants not paying attention to the stimuli in the task. 
In order to address this issue in standard dot-probe ABM tasks, a novel attention-training 
task that employs eye-tracking as opposed to a dot-probe paradigm has been evaluated. 
The trials of eye-tracking ABM tasks (ET-ABM) are controlled by participants’ eye 
movements, in that participants must engage with specific valences of emotional 
information before they can proceed with subsequent trials. This type of attention-
training task helps to ensure that participants visually engage with the emotional stimuli 
and probe stimuli, and while ET-ABM has only been evaluated in two studies to our 
knowledge, it has been able to reduce depressogenic attention biases in healthy and 
dysphoric individuals (Ferrari et al., 2016; Möbius, Ferrari, van den Bergh, Becker, & 
Rinck, 2018). It is important for future studies to continue to evaluate the efficacy of ET-
ABM in altering depressive attentional biases, as the design of ET-ABM tasks helps to 
ensure that participants are attending to the stimuli in the intended manner.   
The above paragraphs discuss possible reasons why the current study may have 
failed to detect an ABM effect. However, it should also be noted that the current study 




argued to be generally inefficacious in altering attentional patterns in depression 
(Emmelkamp, 2012). As previously mentioned, multiple meta-analyses have highlighted 
that ABM has generally demonstrated small and variable effect sizes in regard to altering 
depressive-attention biases (Beard et al., 2012; Mogoaşe et al., 2014; Cristea et al., 2015). 
Some authors have argued that the ineffectiveness of dot-probe ABM tasks in changing 
depressive attention biases may be due to the fact that these tasks target automatic 
attentional processes. More specifically, attentional patterns in depression are related to 
controlled and elaborative cognitive processes, so dot-probe ABM tasks may fail to 
reliably alter depressive attention patterns because they target automatic rather than 
elaborative attention processes (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011; Teachman, 
Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012; Duque & Vazquez, 2018). Since dot-probe tasks 
have successfully altered attention for dysphoric information in several studies (Wells & 
Beevers, 2010; Beevers et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2015), it has also been suggested that 
targeting automatic attentional processes through dot-probe tasks can still result in 
changes in depressive attention biases. However, there is growing evidence to suggest 
that failing to target and train controlled attention processes can render dot-probe ABM 
tasks ineffective in the context of depression. Thus, it is possible that attention-training 
aimed specifically at enhancing controlled attention processes rather than automatic 
processes may be more effective at modifying attention biases found in depression.  
Alternatively, our results may reflect a genuine result indicating that ABM does 
not effectively alter attention bias. As noted above, there is considerable heterogeneity in 
results of ABM on depression biases and symptoms (Mogoaşe et al., 2014; Cristea et al., 




bias for positive results or other research-related biases (Francis, 2012; Lindsay, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the current study contributes to the field by providing some boundary 
conditions on the efficacy of ABM for modifying depressogenic biases.   
 
Exploratory Findings 
Exploratory analyses revealed that pre-training depressive and anxiety symptoms 
did not affect change in attention for emotional information across all of our conditions. 
These findings imply that initial depression or anxiety symptom severity does not 
necessarily affect whether attention-training paradigms resulted in successful change in 
attention for any category of emotional information. These findings are in contrast to 
prior work suggesting that the efficacy of ABM in altering attention is dependent on 
symptom severity; in a study conducted by Baert and colleagues (2010), they found that 
participants with mild depressive symptoms experienced a change in attention after 
completing an attention-training paradigm, but that participants with moderate to severe 
depressive symptoms did not experience a change in attention or symptomology. These 
contrasting findings may be explained by differences in the composition of samples. In 
the experiments conducted by Baert and colleagues (2010), their samples were comprised 
of individuals with a broad range of depressive symptoms. Our sample demonstrated a 
relatively limited range of pre-training depression symptoms in the current study (4 
participants fell into the severe category of depressive symptoms), so it may be the case 
that if our sample was comprised of a greater number of participants with moderate to 
severe depressive symptoms we may have found findings consistent with Baert and 




does not affect magnitude of change in attention after completing an attention-training 
task. 
Additionally, our results indicate that change in depressive symptoms was not 
significantly associated with change in attention for dysphoric information. This finding 
is in contrast to prior work suggesting that altering attention is a necessary mechanistic 
component of ABM programs in order to yield a reduction in depressive symptoms 
(Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Clarke et al., 2014). At the same time, our 
sample was not comprised of individuals with elevated depressive symptoms, and as 
stated above our sample did not demonstrate typical depressive attentional patterns. 
Therefore, the composition of our sample may have precluded us from being able to 
detect a relationship between change in attention and change in symptoms, as there was a 
limited range for depressive symptoms and depressive attention biases. Still, the lack of 
relationship between change in attention and change in symptoms in the current sample 
highlights the need to further understand whether altering attention serves as the 
mechanism for change in depressive symptoms in ABM tasks.  
While there were no differences between the active training conditions and 
control condition in regard to change in dysphoric and positive information, the content 
disengagement condition resulted in significant decreases in attention for dysphoric and 
significant increases for positive information compared to no change. None of the other 
active training conditions resulted in significant changes in attention to dysphoric or 
positive information compared to no change. These findings should be interpreted 
cautiously given that the content disengagement condition did not differ significantly 




indicating that disengaging with the emotional content of emotional images may be a 
more effective method of altering depressive attentional patterns compared to standard 
dot-probe tasks (Notebaert et al., 2015). This finding highlights the need for future 
attention-training studies to expand to novel tasks designed to alter attention, such as ET-
ABM or other attention-training methods that involve disengagement from emotional 
content.  
Prior work evaluating attention biases suggests that some attention biases may be 
facilitated by gender differences. More specifically, previous studies suggest that men 
demonstrate decreased attention to emotional faces generally compared to women 
(Pfabigan, Lamplmayr-Kragl, Pintzinger, Sailer, & Tran, 2014). Moreover, past studies 
have found that men spend more time attending to neutral information, and women spend 
more time attending to socially threatening faces (i.e., disgust faces; Kraines, Kelberer, & 
Wells, 2017; Goos & Silverman, 2002). In the current study, gender was not related to 
differences in attention training, but our exploratory analyses revealed that males spent 
more time attending to scenes displaying threat-related situations prior to and after 
completing the attention training paradigms, which is consistent with other work 
indicating males demonstrate attentional biases toward angry faces (Rotter & Rotter, 
1988). Males also spent more time attending to emotionally neutral scenes prior to 
completing the attention-training paradigms, which is consistent with past work (Kraines 
et al., 2017). The effect of gender on attention biases is a relatively understudied area of 
research, and the findings from the current study indicate that additional studies are 





 Limitations of the current study include the use of an undergraduate student 
sample, as these findings may not translate to the general population. Moreover, our 
sample demonstrated low levels of psychopathology, and consequently our findings may 
not generalize to clinical samples. Additionally, our attention-training tasks involved 
images of emotional faces, but attentional biases were assessed utilizing scenes of 
emotional situations. This discrepancy in the type of stimuli used could partially account 
for the lack of changes in attention bias. At the same time, utilizing different types of 
stimuli to train and assess attention would require any ABM effects to generalize to 
different types of emotional stimuli, which would have indicated stronger effects of ABM 
if there were any ABM effects in the current study. Finally, eye-tracking is a more 
strenuous method of assessing change in attention bias compared to dot-probe tasks. 
Since we utilized a dot-probe task to train attention, it is possible that the training effects 
of our conditions did not translate to eye-tracking. However, using eye-tracking to assess 
changes in attention required a more robust effect of ABM on attention; since the effect 
of ABM was not strong enough to translate across different types of attention, this raises 
questions concerning the clinical utility of ABM.    
Strengths 
 The current study also had several notable strengths. The current study was a very 
careful examination of different training methods that dismantle different attentional 
processes that may be important for attention-training. This was the first study to 
compare four separate methods of attention bias modification, and accordingly we were 
able to gain a better understanding of which methods of attention-training were or 




compared to other attention-training studies (Wells & Beevers, 2010; Browning et al., 
2012; Notebaert et al., 2015), which increases our confidence that our results were not 
due to chance. Moreover, we utilized eye-tracking in order to assess for attention biases. 
Eye-tracking is considered to be a more valid evaluation of sustained attention bias 
compared to other tasks that evaluate attention bias, such as the dot-probe task or 
emotional Stroop task (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012).  
Conclusions 
 The purpose of our study was to identify which mechanism of attention change is 
necessary to alter attention biases for dysphoric and positive information. None of the 
attention-training conditions in this study were more effective than a no-training 
condition at altering attention for dysphoric and positive information.  Therefore, our 
findings suggest that the methods of ABM utilized in the current study are not effective 
means of altering attention biases for dysphoric or positive information, drawing into 
question the efficacy of ABM tasks in modifying attention. While our study essentially 
found that ABM tasks are not effective means for enhancing adaptive attention biases, 
there are many other parameters that have been identified as potentially important for the 
efficacy of ABM that should be investigated in future studies. At the same time, these 
findings raise important questions about the strength, or presence of, effects of ABM on 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Cognitive models of depression posit that attention biases for dysphoric emotional 
information contribute to the etiology and maintenance of depressive symptoms (Beck, 
1976; Ingram, 1984). Empirical studies have supported cognitive theories of depression 
by consistently demonstrating that attention biases for dysphoric information are related 
to the development and course of depressive symptoms (Beevers & Carver, 2003; Wells 
& Beevers, 2010; Disner, Shumake, & Beevers, 2017). As attention for dysphoric 
information is associated with the experience of depressive symptoms and mood states, 
increasing amounts of studies have evaluated different methods of experimentally 
altering attention biases. 
 Attention bias modification (ABM) was first developed as a dot-probe paradigm 
that was designed to systematically train individuals to attend to specific valences of 
emotional information (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). 
ABM has been studied in the context of altering attention biases for threatening and 
dysphoric information, and while there is evidence suggesting that attention training 
paradigms are successful in altering attention biases (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; 
Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012), there is inconsistent information 
regarding the efficacy of specific methods of attention-training in altering attention biases 
for different valences of emotional information.  The proposed study aims to directly 
evaluate and compare the efficacy of four different attention-training paradigms in 





Attention Bias in Depression 
 Cognitive models of depression focus on the role that maladaptive or 
dysfunctional cognitive processes play in the experience of depressive symptoms.  More 
specifically, Beck’s (1976) cognitive model of depression infers that engaging in 
maladaptive cognitive patterns or styles (e.g., negative thoughts about the self, attending 
to dysphoric information) increases the likelihood of experiencing depression. 
Information processing models of depression (e.g., Ingram, 1984) further suggest that 
individuals who experience depressive mood states are more likely to experience 
negatively biased cognitive processes (e.g., attention, interpretation), resulting in the 
continued experience of depressive symptoms. Specifically, these models postulate that 
consistently attending to and elaborating upon information consistent with one’s 
depressive mood serves to facilitate the maintenance of depression.   
 Over the past several decades, attention biases for emotional information have 
been studied thoroughly in the context of depression. Early studies examining 
relationships between attention biases and depressive symptoms indicated that depressed 
individuals lacked an attentional bias for positive information that non-depressed 
individuals possess, suggesting that depressed individuals don’t preferentially attend to 
dysphoric stimuli, but rather avoid attending to positive, mood-incongruent stimuli 
(Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1998; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995). However, these early 
studies used relatively brief stimulus durations (e.g., 250 ms) that evaluate quicker, more 
automatic attention bias. When studies presented stimuli for longer durations (e.g., 1000 




dysphoric, mood-congruent information (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Koster, De Raedt, 
Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010).  
Moreover, there is also evidence to suggest a positive relationship between 
depressive symptom severity and attention bias for dysphoric information, as individuals 
experiencing more severe depressive symptoms demonstrate more pronounced attention 
biases for dysphoric information compared to those experiencing mild depressive 
symptoms (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2009). Studies using eye-tracking rather than 
reaction time also demonstrated sustained attention to dysphoric stimuli (e.g., Kellough, 
Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008; Bianchi & Laurent, 2015; Duque and Vázquez, 2015). 
Importantly, there is evidence suggesting that attention biases for dysphoric information 
are not associated with other types of psychological distress, as other anxiety-related 
disorders are typically associated with attention biases for fear- or threat-related stimuli 
(Gotlib et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). As attention biases for dysphoric information 
have consistently been demonstrated in depressed samples when the stimuli are presented 
with a longer presentation duration, it can be inferred that depressive symptoms are 
associated with more sustained, elaborative attention for dysphoric information rather 
than immediate orientation biases for dysphoric stimuli, and that attention biases for 
dysphoric stimuli are a unique feature of depression.  
 The findings from the aforementioned studies infer that biased attention for 
dysphoric information is a characteristic of depression, but do not indicate whether 
attention biases are related to the course or duration of depressive symptoms. 
Accordingly, it’s important to explore research that has evaluated whether attention 




conducted by Beevers and Carver (2003) evaluated whether attention biases and 
persistence of negative mood could interact with life stress to predict increases in 
depression symptoms after a 6- to 8-week period. In this study the authors experimentally 
induced a sad mood state by instructing participants to visualize their best friend 
suffering through various stages of cancer, from diagnosis to death. Attention was 
measured at baseline and post-induction utilizing a dot-probe task. In the initial session 
participants also reported on their level of sadness throughout the dot-probe tasks. At the 
follow-up session, participants completed measures of life stress and depressive 
symptoms. The authors found that increased attention for dysphoric stimuli from baseline 
to post-induction interacted with higher levels of life stress to prospectively predict 
increased depressive symptoms. At the same time, attentional biases were only weakly 
associated with persistence of depressed mood, despite the fact that both factors 
explained unique variance in prospective depression. Still, the findings from this study 
specifically suggest that attention biases for dysphoric information increase one’s 
vulnerability for developing depression, as attention for dysphoric information moderated 
(strengthened) the relationship between life stress and depression.  
A study conducted by Clasen, Wells, Ellis, and Beevers (2013) further explored 
how attention biases are related to depression vulnerability by specifically evaluating 
whether attention biases for emotional information were associated with impaired mood 
recovery following a sad mood induction. The sample utilized in this study was 
comprised of depressed and healthy (i.e., non-depressed) individuals. Attention bias was 
measured utilizing an exogenous cueing task. Additionally, participants were randomly 




to sad music and thinking about a time in their life when they were sad. The order of the 
exogenous cuing task and mood induction was counterbalanced. Both depressed and non-
depressed participants who demonstrated attention biases for dysphoric stimuli 
experienced greater reactivity to the sad mood induction task and increased latency in 
recovering from the mood induction paradigm. Moreover, attention biases were more 
strongly associated with impaired mood recovery in depressed participants compared to 
non-depressed participants. These findings directly implicate attention biases for 
dysphoric information in the maintenance of sad mood states, further implying that 
attention biases for dysphoric information serve to worsen depression vulnerability.  
While the findings from the Beevers and Carver (2003) demonstrated that 
attention biases for dysphoric information interact with stressful life events to predict 
future depressive symptoms, their findings do not directly support a relationship between 
attention biases and naturalistic symptom change. Disner, Shumake, & Beevers (2017) 
conducted a study that evaluated whether attention biases could independently predict 
depressive symptom severity over the course of six weeks. Participants recruited for this 
study all endorsed elevated levels of depression prior to participating in the study. The 
authors took baseline measurements of mood and measured attention utilizing a 
combined dot-probe and eye-tracking task. The authors continued to measure mood 
online weekly for a period of 6 weeks after the initial baseline measurement. The authors 
found that baseline attention bias for negative words was a significant predictor of 
depression symptom course over that 6-week period. More specifically, participants who 
spent more time fixating on negative stimuli demonstrated worsened depressive 




demonstrated greater symptom recovery. These findings directly support Ingrams’s 
(1984) cognitive model of depression by suggesting that attention biases for negative 
information predict naturalistic symptom change, such that negative biases in attention 
predict a natural worsening of depressive symptoms. Additionally, these findings 
strengthen the evidence that attention biases for dysphoric information contribute to 
depression vulnerability.   
The aforementioned studies are of great importance as they collectively implicate 
attention for dysphoric information in the course of depression; however, they are not 
able to determine whether attention biases play a causal role in the experience of 
depression. Accordingly, it is important to evaluate work that has investigated the causal 
nature of the relationship between depression and attention for dysphoric information.    
Attention Bias Modification in Depression 
 Overview of Attention Bias Modification 
Most attention bias modification (ABM) studies have been influenced by a 
seminal study conducted by MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, and Holker 
(2002). In this study, the authors systematically trained individuals to either attend away 
from or toward negative information. They used a modified dot-probe task where the 
probe appeared more often (~ 85%) in the location of either the negative (in the train 
negative condition) or neutral (in the train neutral condition) stimulus. This contingency 
was designed to implicitly train participants to attend to the particular stimulus type. 
After training, participants completed a stressful anagrams task and then recorded their 
mood state. Participants in the train negative condition demonstrated a more negative 




neutral condition and this effect was replicated in a second study. The results from these 
studies are of particular importance as the authors were able to directly establish a causal 
connection between attention bias and emotional experience, as directly manipulating 
attention toward negative information resulted in a more negative response to stress 
compared to the train neutral condition. Based on their findings, the authors suggested 
that a neutral or positive training condition might be used therapeutically to improve 
symptoms of emotional disorders, and laid the foundation for subsequent ABM studies to 
expand attention-training research.   
Since the study conducted by MacLeod and colleagues (2002), multiple meta-
analyses have examined ABM for both anxiety and depression to evaluate the utility of 
ABM tasks in reducing symptoms and altering attention.  For example, Beard, Sawyer, 
and Hofmann (2012) evaluated 37 attention-training studies that utilized varying methods 
of ABM across multiple symptom presentations, including generalized anxiety, 
depression, social anxiety, and substance abuse. Their findings indicate that ABM was 
effective in improving anxiety and depressive symptoms, but was ineffective in 
improving distress related to substance use disorder. Additionally, while the results in 
aggregate suggest that ABM is effective in altering attentional biases, the effect sizes for 
studies evaluating different methods of attention-training methods varied significantly. In 
other words, different studies that utilized similar or identical training paradigms (e.g., 
neutral-training vs. control) demonstrated variable effect sizes for changes in attention.  
Another meta-analysis conducted by Mogoaşe, David, and Koster (2014) revealed 
consistent findings as there were mixed results regarding the efficacy of ABM in 




reducing anxiety and depression symptoms. Moreover, while the overall ABM effect size 
for altering attention bias across all studies was significant in this meta-analysis, the 
average effect size for altering attention bias specifically within depressed samples was 
non-significant. While the authors did not conduct any analyses based on specific type of 
training methodology, these findings specifically suggest that ABM has varying efficacy 
in terms of altering attention biases in individuals experiencing depressive symptoms.  
Findings from a third meta-analysis conducted by Cristea, Kok, and Cuijpers 
(2015) indicate further ambiguity regarding the efficacy of ABM. The authors for this 
meta-analysis did not take specifically take note of different kinds of attention-training 
tasks and instead focused on cognitive bias interventions generally. Interestingly, their 
analyses revealed small effect sizes for all of the ABM interventions in regard changes in 
symptomology and attention. Moreover, there was a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
effect sizes, suggesting that ABM procedures demonstrate variable degrees of efficacy 
regardless of the primary outcome or sample. The findings from these meta-analyses 
collectively raise concerns regarding the efficacy of ABM in modifying symptoms and 
attention, and further highlight the need for more research to evaluate and better 
understand the mechanistic processes of ABM.  
As ABM was developed as a clinical tool for reducing anxiety and depressive 
symptoms, the primary outcome of ABM research has been symptom change. However, 
some ABM tasks have failed to successfully modify attention biases, and consequently 
these same tasks also failed to alter emotional vulnerability or distress (e.g., Baert, De 
Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; see Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014, for a review). 




important to understand which methods of ABM are reliable in altering attention for 
emotional information. In order to gain a better understanding of the efficacy of specific 
attention-training methods in altering attention biases, it is important to evaluate findings 
from individual ABM studies. While the meta-analyses collectively suggest ambiguity 
regarding ABM’s efficacy in symptom reduction and altering attention biases, individual 
ABM studies provide more detailed information about the efficacy of specific 
mechanisms of attention-training in altering attention.   
Attention Bias Modification in Depression 
One of the first studies to evaluate the clinical utility of ABM in the context of 
depression was conducted by Wells and Beevers (2010). In this study, the authors 
evaluated whether training attention away from dysphoric information and toward neutral 
information would result in subsequent reductions in depressive symptoms. Participants 
in this study were assigned to either training or control (e.g., no training) conditions. In 
both conditions, one emotionally neutral image was presented simultaneously with one 
dysphoric image, and the stimulus presentation was either 3000 ms (for face image pairs) 
or 4500 ms (for more complex images of emotional scenes). After the images 
disappeared, a small single or double asterisk probe image appeared in the location of one 
of the images and remained on the screen until participants pressed a key to identify the 
probe. In the training condition, the probe appeared in the location of the neutral stimulus 
in 85% of the trials, whereas in the control condition the probe stimulus appeared in the 
location of the neutral and dysphoric stimuli with equal probability. After completing the 
attention-training paradigms, participants in the active training condition experienced 




symptoms, while participants in the control condition did not demonstrate any significant 
changes in either outcome. Moreover, the effect of training on depressive symptoms was 
mediated by attention for dysphoric information. As systematically training attention 
away from dysphoric information facilitated a significant decrease in depressive 
symptoms, the findings from this study directly implicate attention biases for dysphoric 
information as a causal factor in the development of depression. These findings also 
suggest that training individuals to attend to neutral information is effective in reducing 
attention biases for dysphoric information and depressive symptoms.  
Given the causal role that attention biases for dysphoric information play in the 
experience of depression, Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, and Koster (2010) conducted two 
experiments wherein they investigated the clinical utility of a different ABM paradigm in 
a sample of dysphoric students (experiment 1) and clinically depressed in- and out-
patients (experiment 2). The authors utilized a spatial cuing paradigm to train attention, 
wherein participants in the training condition were presented with a positive word (e.g., 
smart) in half of the training trials and a dysphoric word (e.g., sad) in the other half of the 
trials on either the left or right visual field. In 90% of the positive word trials a probe 
stimulus would appear in the same visual field as the positive word and participants 
would respond when they identified the probe (valid trial); in 90% of the dysphoric word 
trials the probe stimulus presented in the opposite visual field to the negative word 
(invalid trial). Individuals in the control condition were not systematically trained to 
attend to any specific valence of emotional information, as there were an equal number of 
invalid and valid trials for positive and negative words. Both conditions involved 2000 




these experiments were not consistent with the results from the study conducted by Wells 
and Beevers (2010). The findings from both experiments indicate that simultaneously 
training individuals to attend away from negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli is 
no more effective than receiving no training in regard to altering attentional biases, 
regardless of depressive symptom severity. Moreover, in the training condition only 
mildly depressed participants experienced mild improvements in symptomology, while 
those with moderate to severe symptom severity actually experienced a worsening in 
depressive symptoms. As the attention-training paradigm not only failed to alter attention 
biases but in some cases worsened depressive symptoms, the findings from this study 
highlight the need to understand more about the mechanistic processes of ABM, as 
methodologically disparate yet conceptually similar methods of attention-training yielded 
inconsistent findings regarding how to effectively manipulate attention in an adaptive 
manner.   
While simultaneously training attention away from negative verbal stimuli and 
toward positive verbal stimuli was not effective in altering attention bias or depressive 
symptoms in the Baert et al. (2010) study, Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, and 
Harmer (2012) conducted a study to evaluate whether training attention toward positive 
stimuli alone would prove to be effective in changing attention. Participants recruited for 
this study were diagnosed with recurrent depression and were randomly assigned to 
positive-training or placebo conditions. Further, for each condition, participants were 
randomly assigned to view either word stimuli or pictures of faces. For the positive-
training condition, the probe stimulus always appeared in the location of the previously 




behind positive and negative stimuli. Consistent with findings from the Baert et al. (2010) 
study, participants in the verbal positive-training condition did not demonstrate 
significant reductions in depression or changes in attention. However, participants who 
completed the facial positive-training condition demonstrated significant increases in 
attention for positive information as well as significant reductions in depressive 
symptoms. These findings suggest that differences in the stimuli used in attention-
training tasks are important, as utilizing pictures of positive faces was more effective than 
utilizing positive verbal stimuli in regard to altering attention for positive information. 
Moreover, these findings provide further support for the causal role that attention for 
emotional information plays in altering emotional states as systematically enhancing 
more adaptive (e.g., non-dysphoric) attentional biases resulted in a subsequent reduction 
in depressive symptoms.  
Arditte and Joormann (2014) aimed to expand on these contradicting findings by 
conducting a study designed to evaluate whether training individuals to attend to positive 
or dysphoric facial stimuli would result in changes in attention bias. The attention-
training paradigms utilized by the authors were modifications of the dot-probe paradigm 
wherein two images of different faces would appear on the left and right visual fields. 
After the two faces were presented for 6000 ms, the faces disappeared and one of two 
probe images appeared in the spatial location where one of the two faces was previously 
presented, and participants were asked to identify which probe image was presented. 
Participants in this study were randomly assigned to either negative, positive, or control 
conditions. In the negative training condition, dysphoric and neutral faces were presented 




face for 80% of the trials. The positive training condition was identical to the negative 
training condition, except that the probe image would appear in the same location as the 
positive face for 80% of the trials. Eye-tracking was utilized pre- and post-training in 
order to assess for any potential changes in attention biases. In this study, neither training 
condition resulted in any significant change in attention compared to baseline. These 
findings directly contradict the findings from the studies conducted by Browning and 
colleagues (2012) but are consistent with the findings yielded from the study conducted 
by Baert and colleagues (2010) in that training individuals to attend to positive 
information did not result in changes in attention bias.  
A study carried out by Beshai, Prentice, Dobson, and Nicpon (2014) evaluated 
whether training attention toward dysphoric stimuli would influence dysphoric mood 
states and thoughts.  In this study, participants were randomly assigned to attention-
training or control groups. Both groups completed attention-training tasks, wherein pairs 
of neutral and dysphoric verbal or pictorial stimuli appeared on a computer screen for 
1000 ms, with the neutral stimulus appearing in the center of the screen and the dysphoric 
stimulus appearing on either side of the neutral stimulus. After this time, the paired 
stimuli would disappear and a probe image would appear, and participants were required 
to indicate where the probe stimulus appeared. For the training condition, the probe 
image appeared where the dysphoric stimulus originally appeared in 75% of the trials in 
order to create a contingency between the probe stimulus and dysphoric stimulus in order 
to train individuals to attend toward dysphoric stimuli; for the control condition, the 
probe image appeared behind the dysphoric stimulus in 50% of the trials. Despite only 




participants in the training condition demonstrated significant elevations in attention for 
dysphoric information compared to controls. Consequently, participants in the training 
condition experienced significant elevations in depressed mood after completing the 
attention-training paradigm compared to those in the control group.  
Beevers, Clasen, Enock, and Schnyer (2015) extended the work done by Wells 
and Beevers by utilizing a sample comprised entirely of adults who met criteria for Major 
Depressive Disorder. The authors utilized the same attention-training paradigm from the 
Wells and Beevers (2010) study, however they utilized 1568 training trials over 8 training 
sessions. Attention biases were measured pre- and post-training utilizing a dot-probe task 
that displayed positive and dysphoric stimuli. Individuals in the training condition 
demonstrated significantly reduced attention biases for dysphoric information.  
Additionally, Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, and Zhang (2015) conducted a randomized 
controlled trial to evaluate the long-term effects of an attend-neutral ABM task in 
individuals with depressive symptoms. The attention-training tasks in this study were 
methodologically similar to the tasks utilized by Wells and Beevers (2010) and Beevers 
and colleagues (2015); however, the presentation duration for the stimuli utilized in the 
attention-training tasks was altered to 2000 ms, they utilized word stimuli as opposed to 
faces, and the probe stimulus appeared in the location of the neutral word in 90% of the 
trials. Attention bias was measured utilizing a similar dot-probe tasks, and participants 
completed 8 sessions within a 2-week timespan. Participants in the ABM condition 
demonstrated significant reductions in attention bias for dysphoric information and 
depressive symptoms, and these reductions in depressive symptoms were maintained 




A study conducted by Notebaert, Clarke, Grafton, and MacLeod (2015) expanded 
attention-training research by comparing standard dot-probe tasks to a novel attention-
training task called the person-identity-matching (PIM) task. The PIM involves 
simultaneously presenting participants with two “cards”, with each card displaying two 
faces: a happy face and an angry face. There were two separate PIM conditions in this 
study: the attend-happy condition, which involved having participants judge whether the 
identity of the actor displaying a happy face on both cards matched, or the attend-angry 
condition, which involved having participants discern whether the identity of the actors 
displaying an angry face matched. The dot-probe conditions involved presenting 
participants with two images of a happy face and an angry face for 500 ms, after which 
time the images were replaced by a probe image and participants were required to 
identify the specific probe image. The probe stimulus always appeared behind the happy 
face in the train-happy dot-probe condition, and the probe stimulus always appeared 
behind the angry face in the train-angry condition. Attention bias was measured utilizing 
a similar dot-probe task, however the probe image appeared in equal frequency between 
the location of the happy and angry images. The results indicated that both of the PIM 
tasks were more effective than their respective dot-probe paradigms in altering attentional 
biases for angry and happy faces. In fact, neither of the dot-probe paradigms were able to 
significantly alter attention toward happy or angry stimuli. These findings are of 
particular importance because the methodology of the PIM task is unique, in that 
participants do not establish a contingency with the emotional content of the stimuli like 
in typical dot-probe tasks, and instead focus on extraneous, non-emotionally charged 




insufficient evidence to definitively suggest which attention-training method is more 
effective in altering attention as this is the only study to our knowledge that has utilized 
the PIM task; however, the results from this study suggest that disengaging from the 
emotional content of stimuli may be another effective mechanism of altering attentional 
biases.  
LeMoult, Joormann, Kircanski, and Gotlib (2016) conducted the first study to 
evaluate whether attention biases can be modified in adolescent females who had a 
familial risk for depression. The authors utilized a modified dot-probe task wherein pairs 
of faces were presented for 1500 ms; one of the faces displayed a neutral emotional 
expression while the other face displayed either a happy or a sad expression. After the 
images disappeared, a gray dot appeared in the location of one of the previously 
displayed images. Participants were randomly assigned to a valid training condition or a 
sham training condition. For the valid training condition, the gray dot appeared behind 
the happy expression in 100% of the happy trials (e.g., neutral and happy presented), and 
behind the neutral expression in 100% of the sad trials (e.g., neutral and sad); for the 
sham trial, the dot appeared behind the emotional expression on 50% of the happy and 
sad trials. Additionally, the authors included a negative mood induction paradigm after 
attention-training to evaluate whether their ABM task would buffer against the 
experience of sad mood. The results indicated that participants in the valid training 
condition experienced significant increases in attention for positive information and 
significant decreases in attention for dysphoric information. Moreover, only participants 




A similar study was conducted by Yang, Zhang, Ding, and Xiao (2016), however 
the authors recruited adolescents with current MDD diagnoses. Additionally, participants 
randomized to the active training condition completed two separate dot-probe tasks over 
the course of 13 weeks: a neutral ABM task and a positive ABM task. The neutral task 
involved presenting pairs of neutral and sad verbal stimuli for 2500 ms, after which the 
stimuli disappeared and a probe stimulus appeared where the neutral word was presented 
in 90% of the trials. The trials in this positive training task involved presenting pairs of 
positive and neutral stimuli, neutral and sad stimuli, and positive and sad stimuli. In this 
task, the probe stimulus would always appear in the location of the positive stimuli for 
the trials that included positive stimuli, and in the location of the neutral stimuli for the 
trials that included the pairing of neutral and sad stimuli. Participants in the placebo 
condition completed identical tasks, however the probe stimulus appeared equally often 
in the position of the sad, neutral, and positive stimuli. Attention biases were assessed 
using additional dot-probe trials, and the authors measured attention bias after 
participants completed each training paradigm. The results indicated that, relative to the 
placebo condition, participants in the active training condition experienced significant 
reductions in attention for negative stimuli. Moreover, the active training conditions also 
resulted in significant reductions in clinician-rated depressive symptoms. While these 
findings are limited to adolescents with depression, they provide additional evidence that 
training attention toward positive stimuli and away from dysphoric stimuli is effective in 
altering negative attentional biases and improving depressive symptomology.  




The aforementioned ABM studies have contributed to our understanding 
concerning the efficacy (or lack thereof) of various attention-training paradigms in 
altering attention biases and emotional vulnerability. However, the studies also varied in 
terms of the methodology of their tasks and the findings from their studies (see Table 5).  
Given these differences in study design, it is important to identify which elements 
are necessary and sufficient for ABM to be efficacious. Clarke and colleagues (2014) 
noted that ABM studies that did not change attention bias did not result in mood change. 
They state, “The fact that some studies have failed to successfully modify selective 
attention, and consequently have not modified emotional vulnerability, suggests that 
more work remains to be done in order to identify the conditions under which ABM is 
likely to be most effective in producing the target attentional change” (2014, p. 5). As 
such, we have identified some limitations of prior studies that present a barrier to 
identifying specific mechanisms that contribute to change in attention bias. 
First, as described above, a modified dot-probe is the most commonly used 
attention-training task (e.g., Wells & Beevers, 2010; Beevers et al., 2015), but this task 
mixes attentional engagement with non-dysphoric stimuli with some amount of 
attentional disengagement from dysphoric stimuli. The dot-probe task presents two 
images simultaneously and, after the offset of the images, a probe appears in the location 
of one of the images. As noted above, in attention training, there is a contingency where 
the probe appears more often in one location, which implicitly trains participants to 
attend to that particular stimulus. However, the participants may view both stimuli as 
they are presented and the attentional process may involve disengagement from the non-




mixture of attentional processes, it is unclear which attentional mechanism is necessary 
or sufficient to change attention bias.  
Second, most ABM tasks that are designed to decrease attention to dysphoric 
information do not actually involve disengagement from dysphoric stimuli because the 
dysphoric stimulus is not on the screen at the same time as the probe image at the time of 
response (e.g., Wells and Beevers, 2010; Baert et al., 2010; Beevers et al., 2015). 
Because the dysphoric stimulus is not presented with the probe image, this precludes the 
ability to draw conclusions regarding the efficacy of disengaging from dysphoric stimuli 
in altering attention. This is problematic as it hinders our ability to evaluate whether 
training attention away from dysphoric information actually reduces attention biases for 
dysphoric information.  
Third, most attention-training studies focus specifically on spatial disengagement 
or engagement with specific valences of emotional stimuli. However, it may be possible 
to train participants to disengage from the emotional content of stimuli by focusing on 
other aspects of the stimuli without a spatial shift in attention. For example, the study 
conducted by Notebaert and colleagues (2015) involved a task that trained attention by 
having participants attend to non-emotional components of emotional stimuli (identity of 
the actors) while maintaining their visual attention on the same stimuli. In this study, this 
method of training attention by disengaging form the emotional content of the image was 
effective in altering attentional biases, however, to our knowledge this was the only study 
evaluating this method of attention-training. Accordingly, further studies need to evaluate 
this promising method of attention-training to further understand if this method is reliable 




Fourth, a multitude of attention-training tasks have been researched, however 
attention-training studies typically do not compare different experimental methods in the 
same study (e.g., Baert et al., 2010; Browning et al., 2012). Typically, ABM studies will 
compare an active training condition to a control condition, which affords the ability to 
draw comparisons between training and no training in terms of attention and symptom 
change. However, as previously mentioned, a multitude of attention-training paradigms 
have been empirically evaluated and at this point no studies to our knowledge have 
directly compared multiple active attention-training paradigms. This limits our ability to 
draw direct comparisons between different mechanisms of attention-training in regard to 











































 Dysphoric Threat Positive Neutral  F-Value 
Valence 2.91(.56)a 2.63(.41)a 7.15(.25)b 5.28(.55)c  236.76** 
Arousal 5.47(.58)a 6.21(.68)b 4.63(.30)c 3.01(.37)d  86.29** 
Luminance 98.49(26.90)ab 76.87(22.25)a 118.83(22.33)b 102.30(22.43)ab  6.44** 
RGB 96.20(26.55)ab 77.16(21.85)a 117.03(23.66)b 99.85(23.45)ab  5.62** 
Table 1. Means (standard deviation) for valence ratings, arousal ratings, luminance 
values, and RGB values for the stimuli utilized in the eye-tracking program. ** = p < 
.001. In each row, values with different subscripts are statistically significantly different 














Table 2. Zero-order correlations between attention indices. 
Attention 
Index 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. .7 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. TVD-D - .90** .77** .10 -.53** -.44** -.33** .03 -.28** -.24** -.18** .03 .46** .41** .40** .08 
2. FD-D  - .86** .08 -.50** -.54** -.44** .03 -.24** -.22** -.18 -.07 .45 .52** .49** .07 
3. FC-D   - .003 -.46** -.52** -.23** .03 -.16* -.15* .10 -.11 .37** .44** 58** .07 
4. FF-D    - -.08 -.04 -.05 .05 -.08 -.06 -.11 .10 .10 .07 .02 .16* 
5. TVD-P     - .89** .66** -.08 .06 .06 -.06 .03 -.65** -.58** -.59** -.07 
6. FD-P      - .74** -.09 .08 .11 -.05 .13 -.56** -.62** -.63** -.05 
7. FC-P       - -.16* .12 .14* .32** .09 -.49** -.56** -.40** -.08 
8. FF-P        - .03 .01 -.01 -.11 -.02 -.03 -.03 .12 
9. TVD-N         - .94** .75** -.08 -.29** -.25** -.19** .04 
10. FD-N          - .78** -.13 -.24** -.23** -.17** .003 
11. FC-N           - -.17* -.19** -.18* .05 -.04 
12. FF-N            - -.02 -.09 -.11 .02 
13. TVD-T             - .93** .85** -.03 
14. FD-T              - .91** -.02 
15. FC-T               - -.05 
16. FF-T                - 
Note. ** = p < .001; * = p < .05; TVD = total visit duration; FD = fixation duration; FC = fixation count; FF = first fixation duration; 





Table 3. Zero-order correlations between change in depression, anxiety, and attention.  
Measure 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
1. PHQ-9 change - .40*** .02 -.11 .08 .002 
2. GAD change  - .05 -.09 -.08 .02 
3. TVD-D change   - -.42** .07 .37** 
4. TVD-P change    - -.02 -.39** 
5. TVD-N change     - .004 
6. TVD-T change      - 
Note. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05; change = change from session 1 to 
session 4; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire-9 item; GAD = Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Scale-7; TVD = Total visit duration; D = dysphoric information; P = positive 

















Table 4. Gender differences in pre-training, post-training, and change in total visit 
duration.  
 Females Males  
 M(SD) M(SD) t-value 
Pre-TVD-D 74.49(24.42) 69.67(20.95) 1.31 
Pre-TVD-P 106.05(39.38) 96.91(32.24) 1.50 
Pre-TVD-N 81.37(21.30) 89.19(26.42) -2.14* 
Pre-TVD-T 68.53(29.70) 79.06(22.96) -2.31* 
Post-TVD-D 71.05(25.73) 66.15(21.43) 1.23 
Post-TVD-P 111.84(47.85) 98.68(37.95) 1.79 
Post-TVD-N 81.69(23.83) 85.24(24.14) -.92 
Post-TVD-T 64.19(29.47) 75.60(28.40) -2.42* 
TVD-D change -3.44(28.62) -3.52(24.04) .02 
TVD-P change 5.79(40.76) 1.77(31.05) .65 
TVD-N change .32 (22.95) -3.95(25.69) 1.12 
TVD-T change -4.19(25.18) -3.46(23.42) -.19 
Note. * = p < .05; change = change from session 1 to session 4; TVD = total visit 
duration; D = dysphoric information; P = positive information; N = neutral information; 
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Figure 1. An example trial used in the eye-tracking tasks. Top Left = neutral, Top Right 














Figure 2. An example of a trial in each of the attention-training conditions. From top to 
bottom: spatial disengagement, positive engagement, combined, content disengagement, 








Figure 3. Depiction of change in attention from pre- to post-training for dysphoric and 
positive information across the training conditions. SD = spatial disengagement; PE = 
positive engagement; COM = combined; CD = content disengagement; error bars 




































Figure 4. Depiction of change in attention from pre- to post-training for neutral and 
threatening information across the training conditions. SD = spatial disengagement; PE = 
positive engagement; COM = combined; CD = content disengagement; error bars 







































Figure 5. Depiction of change in depression and anxiety symptoms across the training 
conditions. SD = spatial disengagement; PE = positive engagement; COM = combined; 
CD = content disengagement; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item; GAD = 



































































To start with, we would like to get some background information from you. 
1. What is your age?  _______  
2. What is your gender?  _______    
3. What is your current marital situation (please check one)? 
_____ Married   _____ Separated  _____ Never 
married/Single 
_____ Common law marriage _____ Divorced   _____ Widowed 
 
4. Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino (see definition below)?  Yes 
 No 
Hispanic or Latino. A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central 
American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.  
 
5. What is your race? (please check one) 
 
 American Indian or 
Alaska Native 
A person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of North, Central, or South America, and who 
maintains tribal affiliations or community attachment. 
 
 Asian A person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian 
subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, 
India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine 
Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 
 Black or African 
American 
A person having origins in any of the black racial 
groups of Africa. 
 
 Native Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific Islander 
A person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. 
 
 White A person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. 
 
 Multiple races  
 











6. What is the highest grade in school you have completed (please check one)? 
 
_____ Less than High School (record actual grade)            _____ A.A. or other degree 
that is not a B.A. or B.S. 
_____ High School                                                                 _____ 4 years of college with 
degree 
_____ 1 year of college or technical school   _____ Postgraduate, M.D., 
Ph.D. 
_____ 2 or more years of college but did not graduate 
 
7. How many people do you live with (not including yourself)? 
 
_____ Number of children  _____ Number of adults 
 
8. During the past year, what was your total family income?   $ 
____________________________ 
 
9.  Do you currently take medication for emotional, mental, or psychological 
problems (e.g., depression, anxiety, ADHD, insomnia/sleep problems)?  No     
Yes 
 
If yes, please list below (if you need additional room, please continue on the back 
of this page): 
 
Date Prescribed Medication name Dosage Reason for 
medication 
    
    
    
 
10.  In the past, did you take medication for emotional, mental, or psychological 
problems (e.g., depression, anxiety, ADHD, insomnia/sleep problems)? No     Yes 
 
If yes, please list below (if you need additional room, please continue on the back 
of this page): 
 
Duration Medication name Dosage Reason for medication 
From                 to    
From                 to    
From                 to    









11.  Have you ever been in therapy or counseling for emotional, mental, psychological, or 
addiction problems?     No     Yes  
 
If yes, please list below (if you need additional room, please continue on the back 
of this page): 
 
Duration Type of provider  




Reason for therapy 
From                 to    
From                 to    
From                 to    
 
12. Have you ever been hospitalized for emotional, mental, or psychological problems 
(e.g., anxiety, depression, drugs)? No     Yes 
 
If yes, please list below (if you need additional room, please continue on the back 
of this page): 
 
Duration Length of stay Reason for hospitalization 
From                 to   
From                 to   
From                 to   
 
13. Has anyone in your family (parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, 
cousins) ever had an emotional, mental, or psychological problem?  No     Yes 














    
    
    
    












14.  Do you have any of the following medical problems: 
 Yes No Prefer not to answer 
Thyroid Problems    
Seizures    
Migraine Headaches    
Diabetes/pre-
diabetes 
   
Hypoglycemia (low 
blood sugar) 
   
Anemia    
Asthma    
Irritable Bowel 
Syndrome  
   
Fibromyalgia    
Cancer    
Heart Disease    
 
15. How old is your biological mother? If you are not sure, please take your best guess. 
_________ 
 





















1. Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 1 2 3 
2. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless  0 1 2 3 
3. Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping 
too much  
0 1 2 3 
4. Feeling tired or having little energy  0 1 2 3 
5. Poor appetite or overeating  0 1 2 3 
6. Feeling bad about yourself-or that you are a 
failure or have let yourself or your family down  
0 1 2 3 
7. Trouble concentrating on things, such as 
reading the newspaper or watching television  
0 1 2 3 
8.  Moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed?  Or the opposite—
being so fidgety or restless that you have been 
moving around a lot more than usual 
0 1 2 3 
9.  Thoughts that you would be better off dead 
or of hurting yourself in some way 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
If you checked off any problems, how difficult have these problems made it for 
you to do your work, take care of things at home, or get along with other people?  
Circle one:   
 




















1.  Feeling nervous, anxious 
or on edge  
0  1  2  3  
2.  Not being able to stop or 
control worrying  
0  1  2  3  
3.  Worrying too much about 
different things  
0  1  2  3  
4.  Trouble relaxing  0  1  2  3  
5.  Being so restless that it is 
hard to sit still  
0  1  2  3  
6.  Becoming easily annoyed 
or irritable  
0  1  2  3  
7.  Feeling afraid as if 
something awful might 
happen  
0  1  2  3  
 
If you checked off any problems, how difficult have these problems made it for 
you to do your work, take care of things at home, or get along with other people?  
Circle one:   
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